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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMUNITY OF GAINS PROVISIONS

Corpus ChristiParish Credit Union v. Martin' held constitutional the provisions of articles 2404 and 2334 of the Civil
Code insofar as they confer control of community assets on the
husband. Mr. Martin mortgaged the home in which the couple
were living, a community asset standing in his and her names,
against the opposition of Mrs. Martin communicated forcefully
both to him and the mortgagee. At the time of the transaction
article 2402 as limited by article 2334 permitted the husband
to do so against the opposition of his wife.' Mrs. Martin, however, alleged that the articles violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The majority opinion, by Justice Dixon with Justices
Sanders, Summers, and Marcus concurring, reasoned that
Mrs. Martin had not alleged a case under the equal protection
clause because (1) she had not complained she had been denied
equal right to mortgage the immovable and (2) she might have
prevented her husband from mortgaging the immovable by
declaring it their "family home" under Revised Statutes
9:2801-04. 3 The minority, Justices Tate, Calogero, and Dennis,
declared articles 2404 and 2334 "obviously" unconstitutional
because of their "arbitrariness" in preferring the husband to
the wife in the control of community assets, an "arbitrariness"
not removed by the right of the wife to take affirmative measures that would render it impossible for the husband to act
without her consent.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center.
1. 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978).
2. 1976 La. Acts, No. 679, amended article 2334 to provide that community
immovables in the names of husband and wife could be leased, mortgaged, or sold only
with the wife's written consent.
3. The majority opinion fails to mention that article 2334 itself gave the wife the
right to prevent the husband from leasing, mortgaging, or selling without her written
consent any community immovable standing in both their names by filing properly an
authentic declaration to that effect.
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Neither the majority nor the minority opinion mentioned
the most important factor of all: there can be no question of
''equal protection" where the parties are free to determine the
order between them (their rights and obligations) by contract.
The mere fact that Mr. and Mrs. Martin did not enter into an
express marriage contract means only that they, being presumed to know the law, must be presumed to have accepted,
or contracted tacitly, the terms of the community of gains set
out in the suppletive law. This very clearly has been the Civilian tradition since 1525. This is the clear implication of article
2807, which declares the community to result from a contract.
This is the precise statement of Revised Statutes 9:264, enacted in 1975 in conformity with the traditional understanding.' Where persons marry without entering into an express
marriage contract because they consciously accept the terms of
the community of gains expounded in the suppletive law, they
contract it tacitly by their inaction. Where they refrain from
entering into an express marriage contract because they are
willing to accept whatever regime the suppletive laws on the
subject expound, they contract the community of gains tacitly.
Where they fail to enter into an express marriage contract because they are ignorant in fact of their right to do so, their
ignorance cannot excuse them for they must be presumed to
know the basic structure of the order of society. To excuse them
is to invite chaos. Even here, then, they must be presumed to
have contracted tacitly the community of gains.'
An even more fundamental point, however, is the fact that
the controversy itself and the majority and minority opinions
presupposed a false premise, that the wife "owns" a half interest in the community of gains before her acceptance of it on
dissolution of the regime. Under the community of gains cer4. LA. R.S. 9:264 (Supp. 1975) reads in part: "This summary [of the matrimonial regime laws of this state] shall emphasize . . . the conclusive presumption of
law that spouses who have not entered into a marriage contract before marriage did
"
contract tacitly the community of gains ....
5. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9, attempts to apply a new matrimonial regime law
to parties already married on the effective date of the act if they have not entered into
an express marriage contract. Because the matrimonial regime of such spouses is
contractual, as explained in the text, the new law cannot be applied to them, if either

spouse objects, without violating the obligations of contract.
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tain assets of the spouses are classified as common or community assets from the moment of their acquisition, but this
is only by way of identificaton of the things that will-be considered part of the mass of which she will have the right to take
half on dissolution of the regime if she will assume personal
liability for half the husband's outstanding debts in matters of
common concern to the spouses. Up until that time the wife has
the right to be protected against the husband's acts in fraud of
her right to demand half the community assets on dissolution
of the regime, but those assets themselves form part of the
husband's patrimony, not hers. The supreme court itself had
recognized this in 1973 in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc.,6 overruling previous erroneous jurisprudence on the point. The matter may be more complicated now since the 1976 enactment of
article 2398, the provisions of which declare that "each spouse
owns a present one-half share in the community property" subject to management by the husband,' but this legislation was
not in effect at the time of the marriage of the Martins or even,
for that matter, at the time Mr. Martin mortgaged the immovable.
In order to appraise the minority opinion on its merits one
would have to assume, as did the justices, that (1) the community of gains is imposed by law on spouses who marry without entering into an express marriage contract and (2) that
under this regime the wife owns a present interest in the community assets. Even then, however, in the writer's opinion,
there would be no arbitrarinessin giving control of community
assets to the husband. It may be true that present public opinion-right or wrong-indicates that this most reasonable delineation of authority in the family cannot be honored without
causing internal friction in some marriages. The writer believes
this state of affairs to exist and that the suppletive law on the
community of gains should be changed to give the wife control
of assets acquired through her efforts and of the revenues they
produce.' But even retention of the present rule hardly can be
6.
7.
8.
(1975).

287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
1976 La. Acts, No. 444.
Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TuL. L. Rav. 555
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considered "arbitrary" and a violation of the equal protection
clause.' The matter addresses itself to the attention of the legislature, not to the judiciary.
THE JUDICIALLY IMPOSED "DOUBLE DECLARATION"

In Phillips v. Nereaux'° the "double declaration" of acquisition with separate funds and for separate purposes, imposed by the judiciary for decades on the husband who would
acquire an immovable as a separate asset, once more was attacked as being without legislative basis or sound reason. This
time the judges agreed in a meticulously written opinion, but
then refused to decree accordingly because they deemed the
long legislative silence to indicate legislative approval. Then
the judges found the legislation-by-silence-rule gender based
and therefore in violation of the equal protection clauses of the
Louisiana and United States Constitutions; but once more they
refused to decree according to their reasoned judgment, this
time because they deemed the Louisiana Supreme Court to
have ruled the "double declaration requirement" constitutional by refusing to review a previous decision in which the
issue had been raised." The writer long has taught that the
"requirement" has no basis in legislation, asserts it has never
been accepted popularly as custom must be, but is of the opinion it would not violate the equal protection clauses if it were
law.12 More serious, however, is the unjustifiable subservience
of the court of appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, a matter that has been discussed in another portion of this Symposium. ,3
9. See Bullock v. Edwards, 403 F. Supp. 913 (E. D. La. 1975) (Rubin, J.).
10. 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
11. Barnett v. Barnett, 339 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 So.
2d 1127 (La. 1977).
12. The reasoning of the writer in appraisal of Corpus Christi Credit Union v.
Martin is applicable to this issue in Phillips v. Nereaux. See notes 4-9, supra, and
accompanying text.
13. See Pascal, Law in General, 39 LA. L. REv. (1979).
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DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

In Hall v. Hall4 the husband had been injured during
marriage and had recovered during marriage damages for losses
accrued and to accrue. Ten days after checks in payment of all
damages had been issued to him the wife sued for divorce and
in time divorce ensued. The wife then sought a declaratory
judgment on whether the damages recovered should be characterized as separate or as community assets. The trial court
divided the damages, attributing a portion to the period following divorce and accordingly characterizing that portion as the
separate asset of the husband. The court of appeal characterized all damages received as community assets, deeming the
now well known solution in West v. Ortegol5 to be restricted to
situations in which the payment of damages is received after
dissolution of the community of gains. The decision is inconsistent with the principle in West v. Ortego and is not saved
by the observation that article 2334 characterizes as community assets all things acquired during marriage that the law
has not labeled separate assets. Were the general statements
of article 2334 to be applied literally and without reference to
the spirit manifested by the laws on the community of gains
as a whole strange results would follow. Receipt during marriage of fees, commissions, and salaries earned before marriage,
and sums recovered during marriage for damages to separate
assets, for example, would have to be classified as community
assets. West v. Ortego and previous recent decisions dealing
with the general problem of characterizing awards resulting
from personal injury during marriage simply recognized what
article 2 of the Civil Code observes, that laws "generally relate
not to solitary or singular cases, but to what passes in the
ordinary course of affairs." These cases judged the facts not to
be covered by the general rules in article 2334, and therefore
invoked article 21 of the Civil Code to do justice by applying
"natural law and reason." The court of appeal should have
done the same in Hall.
14.
15.

349 So. 2d 1349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).
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REIMBURSEMENT OF HUSBAND FOR ALIMONY PENDING SUIT

Frequently the wife is without income pending a suit for
separation or for divorce and the husband is ordered to pay her
alimony. If the suit proceeds to judgment of divorce or separation and there has been a community of gains between the
spouses, then, the community being appreciable and the wife
accepting, the wife may be considered retrospectively to have
had sufficient "means" for her maintenance pending suit, and
therefore enriched without legal cause at the expense of the
husband. In such instances the husband must be reimbursed.
If he has paid the alimony out of separate funds he should be
repaid the whole by the wife. If he has paid out of community
funds, however, as usually will have been the case, he should
be reimbursed half the amount by the wife, for in retrospect
only half the alimony received by her was from funds belonging
to the husband. The decision in Girondella v. Girondella,'6
however, failed to take these considerations into account and
ruled that the husband could not claim a reimbursement because the obligation was his under the legislation.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

The writer approves completely of the Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Sims v. Sims 7 as a construction of existing
law. Following the reasoning announced clearly in T. L. James
v. Montgomery,"5 the court in effect treated the employer's
contributions as well as those by the employee as community
contributions to the retirement plan; and then the court declared the retirement benefits of the employee spouse under the
plan to be community assets when paid, whether during the
community's existence or after its dissolution, to the extent
that they are attributable to the funds contributed to the retirement plan during the existence of the community in question. 9 The court denied that a value could be placed on retire16.
17.
18.
19.
1974), is

347 So. 2d 938 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
The court noted that Langlinais v. David, 289 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir.
inconsistent with its present decision. There the court had awarded the wife
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ment benefits payable only in the future-though it admitted
the spouses or ex-spouses might compromise on this
point-and accordingly denied that either spouse might demand a partition of the right to such future benefits. These
solutions are in complete harmony with the rules on the community of gains as they exist now. The writer is inclined to
believe that pension benefits, though purchased with community funds, should be regardedas belonging to the employee
spouse, but they may not be so regarded under the existing
legislation.
A decision distinguishable from Sims is that in La Caze v.
Tennessee Life Insurance Co. 10 Here the spouses were separated
from bed and board as of August 13, 1975, and the employee
husband ceased being able to work and claimed disability benefits. The wife claimed the payments were community assets
and claimed one-half of them as paid. The concurring opinion
of Judge Watson gives a reason for denying the wife's claim
that seems eminently just. The disability insurance exists to
compensate the employee when he no longer can work and in
the instant case the employee had ceased working only after
the dissolution of the community of gains, a time at which the
community no longer was entitled to the product of his energies. It may be added that when the community is dissolved
during a period for which the disability insurance premium was
paid with employer or employee contributions that are
"community contributions" under Sims, above, then the nonemployee spouse might be reimbursed one-half the amount
that in retrospect is seen to have been paid for the time following dissolution of the community of gains, by way of recovery
for enrichment without cause. This amount, however, does not
appear to have been claimed in La Caze.
one-half the amount the employee husband had contributed from community funds
received as remuneration. Jarred v. Jarred, 355 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), is
inconsistent with Sims for the same reason.
20. 346 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).

